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Maritime security appears to be assuming an increasingly more prominent 
place on the African security agenda. Although the growing scholarly debate and 
international  responses seem to attend to more than piracy, the latter unfortunately 
skews perceptions about Africa’s maritime landscape. The piracy focus suggests a 
limited problem-solving approach, but Africa’s offshore domain calls for a more 
critical stance that entails more than anti-piracy. Perceptions and realities of 
maritime terrorism, piracy, illegal oil bunkering, criminality and unsettled maritime 
boundaries increasingly complicate traditional African threats and vulnerabilities on 
land. The growing range of threats requires a framework to explain events taking 
shape off West and East Africa in particular better. In this regard, the constituent 
elements of good order at sea house a more critical line to view security off Africa 
through safe access to resources (food and minerals), safe sea routes, as well as 
dominium and jurisdiction. Opposition to threats off the African coast tends to 
privilege naval responses, but closer scrutiny reflects that responses are found to 
also display a profile of cooperation between numerous actors and agencies that 
securitise maritime threats beyond piracy. The resultant cooperation reveals 
landward and offshore initiatives that promote maritime security, rather than merely 
fighting piracy. 
Introduction 
Although African leaders attempt to counter pessimistic perceptions of 
Africa,1 an array of threats and vulnerabilities co-exist alongside narratives that 
depict the continent in a more positive light.2 While negative images of the African 
security landscape mostly stem from events on land, offshore threats are competing 
with the landward security emphasis. Views 
of Africa as a haven for pirates help to skew 
understanding of the African maritime threat 
landscape by identifying piracy as the key to 





African maritime security debate must be taken seriously, as the world’s oceans 
offer a most lucrative operating environment to terrorists and criminals, which 
comprises more than a piracy threat.3  
Recent literature on maritime threats and vulnerabilities emphasises the 
Africa piracy nexus, but the wider maritime security sector requires closer attention 
as well. This article  contributes to the debate on Africa’s maritime security by 
accentuating the wider ambit of threats and responses that now embody African 
maritime security. To this end, the narrative attempts to move the argument beyond 
problem-solving theory centred on suppressing piracy to a more critical stance based 
on constituent elements of good order at sea as the preferred condition off the 
African coast. 
Upholding the constituent elements of good order at sea, extending maritime 
security beyond piracy and events on land, and the imperative of security agency co-
operation form the central thesis of the article. The geographic focus covers 
primarily the waters off the eastern and western seaboards of the continent, although 
the narrative also touches upon events along the Mediterranean and Southern 
African coastlines. The argument commences with the growing realisation of the 
importance of Africa’s maritime domain. Secondly, the narrative outlines emergent 
sectors of Africa’s maritime security and the threats that manifest in events 
unfolding off West and East Africa. Having established the insecurities in African 
waters, the third and final section turns to the range of actors and activities 
employed against maritime threats along the western and eastern seaboards of 
Africa. 
An emergent African maritime consciousness? 
A pattern of explicit commitments to secure African offshore assets is a 
rather recent manifestation. One tentative argument for the somewhat low-keyed 
African maritime strategies posits the presence of a landward culture within the 
African strategic outlook and one reinforced by a perception of maritime threats not 
endangering regime security.4 Heuser, quoting Corbett, argues that the term 
‘maritime strategy’ in fact presumes a reciprocal land–sea nexus in operations, and 
she flags the danger of neglecting either one. Maritime strategy ideally ties 
operations at sea to events on land as the former rarely makes sense if its 
relationship with or impact upon land is ignored.5 Against the former backdrop, any 
disregard of offshore threats thus sets a dangerous precedent and one coming of age 
along sections of the African coast.  
To privilege landward over offshore threats and vulnerabilities merely 





ambivalence either stems from them not fully embracing the importance of a secure 
offshore domain, or a deliberate ignorance to attend to matters on land. A lack of 
governance by African authorities to uphold sovereignty in the waters under their 
jurisdiction is accentuated by weak African navies due to the latter not being 
considered as important as armies.6 Addressing the landward security preference 
supposes shifting a preferred security culture to one also responsive to maritime 
security threats and vulnerabilities.7 Such a shift takes time and it is therefore 
essential to point out some indicators of an emergent African maritime disposition. 
Covering a coastline of 26 000 kilometres, the African maritime territory is 
huge. The aforementioned length includes the seabed below and the airspace above, 
all of which add to the maritime sphere over which African coastal states (according 
to the Preamble of the United Nations Convention of the Sea) are required maintain 
jurisdiction.8 Thirty-three coastal states and several islands like Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, and São Tomé & Príncipe, accentuate the scope of maritime 
matters and security in particular. Fifteen landlocked African countries are also 
dependent upon secure maritime zones, and as the second most densely populated 
continent, African maritime threats and vulnerabilities hold dire risks for the large 
African population.9 
Africa’s oceans harbour important resources and lines of communication 
that call for protection, and if necessary, more aggressive defence. Globalisation – 
and its economic pillar in particular – relies on African waters as cogs in the safe 
flow of maritime traffic along international shipping routes. African co-operation to 
safeguard the maritime commons is imperative.10 The oceans also tie Africa into 
global maritime trading and industrial networks that hold critical strategic 
advantages for Africa as well as the wider international community, as the continent 
becomes a future economic entity for markets, labour and resources. Fishing 
resources off Africa are also popular with the international community, not ignoring 
the fact that millions of Africans depend upon fish as their staple source of protein. 
As a rising energy actor, Africa’s growing offshore energy assets drive its role as a 
future gas and oil hub.11 The continent’s global importance is thus also growing due 
to its valuable, but vulnerable maritime landscape – a domain for which it rarely 
receives due recognition, but one to which it is awakening. 
A shift in the scholarly literature since approximately 2005 highlights 
maritime matters in the debate on African security.12 Although piracy and marine 
resources form a primary focus of the literature, the scholarly contributions dovetail 
with indicators of a growing African maritime awareness. Acceptance by African 
Union Transport Ministers of the African Maritime Transport Charter and action 





protection of the African marine environment shows an African concern with 
maritime security.13 During 2010, the African Union (AU) opted to pursue an 
integrated African maritime strategy (briefly known as AIMS 2050) that signifies 
further progress.14 In addition to the AIMS 2050 declaration, the Brenthurst 
Discussion Paper No 3 of 2010 outlines a comprehensive NGO (non-governmental 
organisation) view on an Africa-informed maritime strategy.15 At the sub-regional 
level, the 2011 Heads of State Summit of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in Luanda accepted a maritime strategy to fight piracy along 
the African eastern and western shores respectively.16 African navies also play a role 
since 2005 through the biennial Sea Power for Africa symposia to sensitise their 
governments and ultimately the AU through resolutions emphasising Africa’s 
oceans, its resources, those who live from the oceans and thus the need to protect the 
seas.17 The aforementioned developments flag a recent pattern of African responses 
to maritime vulnerabilities that says something about a declaratory shift away from a 
period of self-imposed sea blindness.18 Securing the seas off Africa is unfortunately 
not simple as preserving good order at sea taxes even modern navies.19 However, 
irrespective of the difficulties involved, the constituent elements of good order at sea 
outlined below require closer attention from African leaders for these elements still 
serve as the mainstay of order off coastal and island states. 
The scope and importance of oil and gas resources at sea are growing rapidly 
and threats to these hubs draw international attention.20 West African waters harbour 
impressive new discoveries of oil and gas, but also dangerous criminal and insurgent 
threats.21 New and lucrative oil and gas deposits off Africa are bound to accentuate 
the importance of certain maritime zones (including the seas off eastern Africa), and 
securing such locations is important for Africa and its growing list of trade partners. 
The McKinsey Report of 2010, for example, alludes to the particular role of oil and 
gas in promoting Africa’s future growth, and such optimism only serves to reinforce 
Africa’s need to secure safe access to its significant offshore oil and gas deposits.22 
The African fishing industry provides a livelihood for large numbers of 
people and the prevention of illegal and unregulated fishing is crucial. Recent 
warnings, such as “The end of the line” documentary programme, clearly accentuate 
pressures upon fishing stocks. Over- and illegal fishing practices are a clear and 
present threat to food resources and one not sparing Africa, but also receiving 
insufficient attention. Piracy off Somalia allegedly mutated from local attempts to 
curb illegal fishing, while dangerous transgressions also take place off West Africa 
with its huge local fishing culture.23 Securing the ocean off Africa as a source of 
food and thus promoting food security for vulnerable coastal populations in 





Secure maritime transport routes are vitally important to the international 
community, and Till accentuates the fundamental role of safe maritime transport 
routes for the globalised world of the 21st century.24 Given the volume of goods that 
flow by sea (irrespective of speculations, the volume remains impressive), the safety 
and security of maritime routes must concern all governments. The density of 
shipping along the African coastline (through the Gulf of Aden, around the southern 
tip and in the Gulf of Guinea) implies that African governments can barely afford 
the maritime ignorance and/or institutional incapacity they display at times.25 As 
Africa enters the global economy as an attractive investment destination and 
resource hub, every African country depends increasingly on the free and 
uninterrupted flow of trade across the oceans to benefit from the economic 
advantage to deliver goods on time to and from Africa. Africa can thus ill afford the 
current uncertainty tainting shipping routes off sections of the West and East African 
seaboards. 
Jurisdiction over the oceans comprises a national and international 
responsibility. Both have legal grounding, but questionable enforcement off Africa 
in particular. Good governance over the ocean requires that each country extends 
effective rule over its territorial waters and that the international society collaborates 
to maintain order on the high seas.26 Such national and international responsibilities 
imply home and away deployments for navies in particular, but also appropriate 
local commitments through government policies.27 Countries are threatened from the 
sea and, although this threat historically shows a tendency to highlight the 
warfighting profile, the current African threat echoes the murky world of 
criminality, low-intensity threats and bad maritime governance. Ungoverned seas 
remain a danger to African states that have limited or no capacity to extend and 
uphold jurisdiction at sea and cannot police even soft maritime threats in a credible 
way.28 Africa’s contribution to dominium over its seas thus remains limited and 
compromises good order at sea. 
Partial governance of littoral waters goes a long way to promote order at sea 
with a maritime approach being of the essence. A maritime approach involves 
“Actions performed by military units in partnership with other government 
departments, agencies and interested partners in the maritime environment to 
counter illegal activity and support freedom of the seas for the protection of national 
and international interests”.29 As a broad outline of maritime security, the 
aforementioned approach accentuates the multiplicity of actors and illegal activities 
at sea that in turn underline the imperative of upholding good order at sea. The 





these two matters receive closer attention in the discussion below, which accentuates 
some detail of African maritime threats. 
African maritime threats 
Sageman (2010) and the abovementioned Brenthurst discussion paper 
(2010) both depict contemporary maritime threats residing or emerging off Africa. 
The 2010 AU maritime security workshop contributed to the debate on Africa’s 
maritime security by stressing the need to address this neglected security domain. 
Amidst the piracy hype, a broader dialogue on understanding maritime threats in 
African waters is taking shape. The focus displayed in the literature remains, 
however, on the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa, but the 
following maritime threats at times also reach beyond these two regions. 
Terrorism  
Luxor in Egypt (1997), Nairobi, Dar es Salaam (1998), Somalia (ongoing), 
Mombassa (2002), Uganda (2010), and Nairobi (2013) all attest to terrorism on 
African soil. At sea, the attacks on the USS Cole (2000) and MV Limburg (2002) in 
the Gulf of Aden are two incidents close to African waters, while the failed 2008 
attack on the Shell Bonga oil platform off Nigeria remains noted due to its distance 
from land.30 Maritime terrorism off Africa is thus possible and a matter reinforced 
by lucrative targets at sea offering opportunities for economic destabilisation, 
punishment of governments tolerating lax coastal and portside security, and access 
of perpetrators to commercial technologies to operate at sea – all of which are 
reinforced by primarily questionable governmental practices facilitating bad order at 
sea.31  
Piracy  
A number of developments promote the escalation in sea piracy as 
experienced by Africa. The growth in shipping traffic and its flow through choke 
points, in particular, turn the attention to the Bab el Mandeb off the Horn of Africa. 
The ongoing international economic crisis draws more people into maritime 
criminality – a matter only fuelling piracy on Africa’s seas. Pressure for more 
landward security after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, over time drained 
resources away from maritime matters and eroded the means of upholding good 
order at sea. Africa already displays an undue fixation with landward security and 
thus increasingly tends to neglect maritime matters. Together with lax security 
measures in ports and coastal waters, official complicity in maritime crimes serves 
to reinforce the piracy threat. Africa unfortunately suffers from a general weakness 





views piracy more broadly as a triad comprising anchorage attacks, robberies against 
ships out at sea and theft of ships and cargo aimed at their conversion as ‘phantom 
ships’ for trade or pirate mother ships.33 Employed rather freely as a broad label for 
attacks on ships, piracy had become the face of Africa’s maritime insecurity. Off the 
Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea and even further south, piracy continues to 
draw significant international attention.34  
Illegal oil bunkering 
Oil bunkering is most prevalent in Nigerian waters and holds national and 
international repercussions. Networks showing a criminal–rebel–government triad 
plague the Nigerian oil industry. The maritime connection plays out at sea through 
pirate tankers, receiving the stolen crude from criminal syndicates and transporting it 
further afield.35 A land–maritime connection operates between armed groups in the 
Niger delta, the maritime tanker syndicates and even corrupt naval/public officials 
reflecting interfaced criminality, political agendas and corrupt public officials. In the 
case of the 2003 MV African Pride incident in Lagos, the crew transferred the ship’s 
illegal oil cargo to a pirate tanker at sea while under naval guard.36 While oil 
bunkering is largely criminal in kind, its intimate nexus with wider oil politics in the 
Niger delta region and a weakly policed Gulf of Guinea places illegal bunkering 
within the ambit of bad order at sea. 
Drug trafficking 
West Africa is a haven for drug trafficking from South America into Europe. 
The Atlantic Ocean serves as one transit route with little impediment from West 
African policing authorities. On the western edge of the Gulf of Guinea, Guinea 
Conakry offers a weakly policed maritime space, allowing drug syndicates (from the 
Caribbean and South America in particular) to move freely from the sea into West 
Africa. Geographic location and unstable political conditions alongside a tolerance 
for smuggling activities form attractive features for the drug traders.37 West Africa 
serves as a transit region for cocaine from South America into Europe and heroin 
from the Middle East to the USA. While Guinea Bissau appears to be the focal 
point, it masks Nigerian involvement in the drug trade through and from West 
Africa.38 Weak jurisdiction at sea tying in with a similar landward weakness 
facilitates drug trafficking from the sea into West African countries, and syndicates 
exploit this void to the full with indicators of a further link to the Tuaregs and even 








People wanting to leave Africa, or who are forced to do so by criminal 
syndicates face a journey by sea, whether across the Mediterranean or the Red 
Sea/Gulf of Aden. Human trafficking and smuggling people who are desperate to 
leave the continent involve criminal syndicates in West Africa, North Africa and 
East Africa.39 Weapon smuggling takes place as well and often serves to fuel 
African armed conflicts.40 The large illegal arms shipment found in the port of 
Lagos in 2010 attests to suspicious or smuggled arms shipments through African 
waters and an incident not yet fully settled by the Nigerian and Iranian authorities.41 
Pirates, poachers, armed militant groups and governments under international arms 
sanctions have a need for arms and thus offer a market for illegal arms shipments 
through weakly policed African waters.  
Pollution  
Rising pollution off the West African coast, off the South African coast, and 
potential pollution in the busy shipping lanes off the Horn of Africa are on record. 
The terrorist attack on the MV Limburg spilling oil into the Red Sea, waste dumping 
from the sea taking place into the interior of the Ivory Coast, and very dangerous 
toxic waste discovered on the Somali coast are some examples of deliberate 
maritime pollution.42 Within the lexicon of good order at sea, pollution threatens the 
African seas (as a source of food and an important environment) and in addition is a 
transgression perpetuated by rogue actors exploiting or sailing the seas and living on 
the shores. The threat affects African populations and their dependence upon pristine 
coastal waters as well as the right to live in an unpolluted coastal environment. 
Whether intentional or not, pollution is a constant threat in African waters with its 
weak or absent policing. The Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper is rather 
explicit about the pollution threat to the safety and security of Africa’s seas – both 
for the seas as well as for its beneficiaries, entailing threats that affect areas much 
wider than the immediate coastal environments. 
Unsettled maritime boundaries 
The growing importance of the sea to African developmental and security 
futures is bound to question the status quo on maritime boundaries. As African 
attention moves offshore, unsettled maritime boundaries could well become 
contested. A host of maritime boundary disputes, unclear offshore demarcations and 
tentative agreements between parties are on record. West Africa shows a particularly 
unsettled profile commencing in the northwest between Morocco, Western Sahara 
and Mauritania regarding maritime boundaries. Further south, ongoing tribulations 





Brazzaville, and the Cabinda–Angola interface also reflect unsettled maritime 
boundaries in a known resource-rich offshore location. The maritime boundary 
between Namibia and South Africa seems to be tolerated, but the low-level dispute 
in the presence of gas, diamonds and possibly oil holds a certain conflict potential.44 
Off the east coast, the maritime boundaries between South Africa, Mozambique and 
Madagascar straddle newly discovered gas deposits, while further north Kenya and 
Somalia also have not ironed out their maritime boundary.45 The majority of these 
boundary disputes and settlements unfold around marine resources of which oil and 
gas are catalysts of possible future interstate disputes.46  
Maritime security off West Africa 
The Gulf of Guinea is roughly demarcated by Angola in the south, and runs 
north towards Cameroon and then west via Nigeria towards Liberia and Sierra 
Leone on its western perimeter. It is a vast area populated by approximately 250 
million people, includes the 500 000 square miles Gulf of Guinea with rich 
hydrocarbon deposits, fish stocks and commercial shipping activities.47 Nigerian oil 
politics tends to dominate maritime threats and vulnerabilities off West Africa, but 
the threat landscape is more complex. Threats originate predominantly from 
volatility in the coastal states,48 as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, the Congo Republic, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, for example, are known for their political turmoil that does 
not leave the littoral domain unscathed. 
Competition between major powers over oil and gas in the Gulf of Guinea 
raises the possibility of armed confrontation – albeit something of the future – as the 
USA, Europe and Asia (China in particular) compete for energy resources.49 Big 
power competition creates client states, and arming them to defend national interests 
indicates that the competition is no longer between multinational corporations only, 
but also between states. As state actors cloak energy security as a vital national 
interest, armed confrontation becomes more probable. Access to offshore oil and gas 
merges with the defence of energy security through armed confrontation, and the 
Gulf of Guinea as a future oil hub could increase militarisation in the region and in 
particular if maritime boundaries are unsettled as well.50 Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria 
and Ghana received or stand to receive new naval vessels, and it is not coincidental 
that these are countries with significant offshore oil and gas deposits, but also 
unsettled maritime boundaries.51  
Below the level of military confrontation, one finds offshore threats of a 
more irregular kind. Some threats flow from littoral countries like Nigeria; others 
enter from beyond the Gulf. Whether mere criminals or insurgents with politico-





Gulf region. Some threats, like theft, disrupt or exploit local port operations while 
piracy threatens vessels passing through these waters to offload or take on cargo 
with oil carriers increasingly becoming a target.52 Certain actors threaten the flow of 
oil or the offshore oil infrastructure, but pollution is also a serious matter in the 
region, with the Niger Delta creeks and fishing stocks heavily polluted and the 
region suffering from widespread illegal flaring.53 
Insecure access to marine resources (oil, gas, fish, etc.), interrupted maritime 
traffic, and weak maritime jurisdiction by the littoral countries erode advantages of 
well-governed oceans to West African societies. Particularly salient is the absence of 
a credible regional capability to deal with threats towards or from the offshore 
domain. Rather large armies and police agencies reside on land, but naval and 
broader maritime capabilities, such as coastguards, remain marginal.54 The Gulf of 
Guinea thus reflects an array of maritime threats emanating from smuggling, oil 
bunkering, unsettled maritime boundaries, pollution and piracy to a land–maritime 
insurgent interface along Nigeria’s coast in particular. Weak dominium at sea also 
allows transgressors to pursue their political and criminal agendas at sea unhindered 
with the most salient impact upon the extraction and harvesting of maritime 
resources (oil, gas and fishing) and those dependent upon safe maritime transport 
routes. 
The aforementioned threats and vulnerabilities harbour an indelible maritime 
face and one noted by the UN (particularly its maritime agency, the International 
Maritime Organisation), the AU, international maritime organisations such as 
Intertanko, the International Maritime Bureau and important players such as the US 
and major oil corporations.55 Offshore threats in West Africa thus enjoy some status 
on governmental and non-governmental security agendas beyond the region, but the 
region is only one African hub of bad order at sea. The other serious maritime threat 
landscape resides off East Africa. 
Maritime security off East Africa 
The east African seaboard covers a maritime expanse from South Africa to 
the Gulf of Aden in the north and into the Red Sea up to Egypt. There are nine 
coastal states with several islands, such as Mauritius, the Grand Comoros, 
Madagascar, Zanzibar and the Seychelles, along this eastern littoral. Although not 
the only threat, piracy epitomises maritime insecurity along the African east coast. 
However, what observers tag as piracy is in fact a mix of attempted attacks, 
robberies and some piracy acts.56 By early 2011, several East African countries 
(Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique) experienced attacks within their 





attacks reported in the first quarter of 2011.58 The ungoverned maritime space off 
Somalia merely reflects the long absence of any authority or governance on land, a 
void eventually filled in 2005 by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) largely 
confined to Mogadishu. The insufficient governance that seeps from Mogadishu is 
unfortunately directed to landward matters, and except for statements, little gets 
done from Mogadishu about the maritime insecurity spreading from Somali waters 
southwards past Kenya to Mozambique and the Seychelles to the east.59 
From a good-order-at-sea perspective, the seas off East Africa became a 
threat landscape with global repercussions, as free and uninterrupted maritime 
transport remains under attack. The number of attacks (237 attacks in 2011, 
dropping to 75 in 2012)60 and attempted hijacks underline the seriousness of the 
threat. A primary international sea route is almost under siege and the global 
shipping industry must cope with a semi-war zone on a strategic route between the 
Persian Gulf, Asia, Western Europe, Africa and the Americas.61 Commercial 
shipping and global maritime trade falling victim to attacks (or the persistent threat 
thereof) cause economic costs to soar through ransoms, delay times, cargoes on hold 
and similar matters. Threats to shipping do not impact externally only, but also 
affect countries in the region as trade through Suez (critical for Egypt) and important 
aid shipments en route to Africa (in the vicinity of the Horn in particular) are 
disrupted.62 
Beyond shipping and with regard to Somalia in particular, lawlessness at sea 
threatens human security. High incidences of piracy originating from Somali soil 
threaten and often curtail the supply of food for large displaced populations 
organised through the UN World Food Programme. Trade flows to Somalia and its 
neighbours come under threat as well while the movement of people attempting to 
leave Somalia by sea leads to loss of life. Maritime militias or pirates threaten a 
wide expanse of the Indian Ocean along the African east coast, and the growing 
number of vessels of all kinds attacked or hijacked reflect its impact.63 
The landward impact of piracy requires attention as well, for it cannot be 
confined to Somalia. Somali piracy places strain upon the weak Somali government 
and affects neighbouring states negatively. The frequent interference with the 
shipping trade holds economic security implications for regional trade and its direct 
and indirect benefits for the region. Exports, vital imports and taxes from shipping 
become threatened – a loss African countries can ill afford.64 Threats to security 
spread over land as well as across the sea as depicted by the October 2011 Kenyan 
military action into southern Somalia. The maritime connection stems from the call 
by Kenya for a blockade of Kismayo in southern Somalia to pressure al-Shabaab, 





as the waters of Mozambique, to which the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) responded with a naval task force. 
The oceans off both East Africa as well as West Africa show a need for good 
order at sea as the threat spectrum reaches beyond that of piracy. Both maritime 
regions suffer from an apparent lack of applied maritime jurisdiction by the 
responsible governments bordering these regions and the following section attempts 
to highlight how threats and vulnerabilities are dealt with off Eastern and West 
Africa. 
Securitisation of two African maritime landscapes  
East and West Africa each harbours regions where threats at sea have drawn 
the attention of African as well as international decision-makers and non-
governmental agencies. Somalia and Nigeria play particularly significant roles as 
both countries harbour security threats and responses where the focus now includes 
the offshore domain. 
East Africa 
The international repercussions of threats to maritime activities off the Horn 
of Africa served to place Somali piracy on the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
agenda. In 2008, the wide support of UN member states allowed for the adoption of 
a number of UNSC resolutions that framed piracy as a threat and paved the way for 
international action – naval action in particular – against Somali piracy. The 
resolutions resulted in a large naval presence of non-African warships off the Horn 
of Africa. The naval contingents created a sense of security for the international 
community and its dependence upon secured maritime transport for trade65 and tied 
together a maritime consciousness and a response repertoire towards the threats off 
the Horn of Africa. Somalia perhaps most graphically displays an interface between 
landward and offshore responses to a growing and newly understood security 
landscape as piracy attacks have declined significantly by late 2012.66 
International naval contingents off Somalia display an extraordinary 
response to the piracy threat. The US, NATO, the EU and individual states like 
Russia, China, India and South Korea maintain a naval presence around the Horn of 
Africa. Combined Task Force 151 emerged in January 2009, Allied Provider of 
NATO in October 2008, followed by Allied Protector in March 2009. In December 
2008, Operation Atalanta of the European Union commenced.67 The naval response 
made the region’s waters safer for merchant shipping through the Gulf of Aden in 





from the area under naval surveillance and thus raised the need for even greater 
international co-operation. 
During late October 2011, Kenyan forces crossed into southern Somalia to 
curb the al-Shabaab threat to Kenya and called for the blockade of Kismayo harbour 
as a logistics conduit for al-Shabaab forces in the south. This inherently called for 
naval forces to block supplies by sea for al-Shabaab that extended maritime security 
beyond the piracy ambit. Kenya averred that al-Shabaab was dependent upon 
seaborne support that had to be interdicted – a matter accentuating a greater military 
response.68 Further south, however, South Africa began to patrol the northern waters 
of the SADC along the Mozambique-Tanzania maritime boundary by February 2011 
by means of a small air–maritime task force.69 The South African reaction unfolded 
amidst persistent reports of a growing South African strategy to increase its naval 
capabilities to become more prominent in maritime operations off the African coast, 
although East Africa was bound to be the priority.70 A maritime strategy approved 
by the South African cabinet (22 April 2011) promised increased budgetary 
allocations (materialising in the 2013–2014 Budget Vote) and statements pointing to 
a growing South African naval presence in SADC waters in the south-western 
Indian Ocean.71 
Fundamental to the attempts to ensure good order at sea, co-operation 
remains pivotal – and not only in the state–naval realm. The 2008 UNSC resolutions 
reflect an international institutional response to maritime threats off the East African 
coast. In addition, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) facilitated the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct in January 2009 with response centres planned for Kenya, 
Tanzania and Yemen. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (circa 
January 2009) represented a further attempt to establish co-operation to fight piracy 
as the main threat to maritime security off Somalia. The UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime also stepped in to help curb the growing threat at sea off East Africa.72 
Several institutions thus co-operate to restore order at sea by creating frameworks 
for enforcing international law through international accords that deal with maritime 
safety and security. 
The private security option raises images of armed contingents guarding 
ships en route through piracy hot spots. However, contributions by security 
contractors on land also play a role.73 Less visible and also less complicated than 
shipborne armed details, private security companies promote good order at sea by 
training and assisting maritime agencies on land in Somalia. Hart Security assisted 
Puntland to establish a coastguard that operated relatively successful against piracy, 
illegal fishing and smuggling at sea.74 As an example, Nordic Crisis Management 





provide training and security services to Somali authorities with the police, harbour 
security force and coastguard as clients. Advice and training, not operations against 
pirates, formed the focus of the security service by NCM.75 However, the most 
direct private security intervention at sea stemmed from the announcement of a 
private navy (Convoy Escort Ltd) that was destined to begin escorting vessels 
through waters off the Horn of Africa by early 2012, and the growing prevalence of 
private armed guards on vessels – whether openly or more clandestine.76 Although 
controversial at times, the contributions of private security contractors have become 
a visible feature in promoting maritime security by protecting vessels, and training 
relevant maritime policing agencies in East Africa. 
West Africa: The Gulf of Guinea 
In West Africa, and in the Gulf of Guinea in particular, a patchwork of 
measures and actors is actively involved in promoting maritime security. While 
securitisation of East African offshore threats resulted in a strong naval response and 
mostly operates under a virtual UN umbrella, this is not the case off West Africa. A 
repertoire of military, institutional and private contributions is nonetheless 
discernible. In addition, a host of resolutions (amounting to 13 by 2010) collectively 
forms conduits for West African actors to address threats to maritime security, while 
about 24 conferences and workshops on matters related to West Africa’s maritime 
domain took place between 2005 and 2010.77 Resolutions and summits continued 
after 2010 as the Economic Community of Central African States and (ECCAS) and 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) gathered to discuss 
the deteriorating situation in the Gulf of Guinea. Amongst these events the June 
2013 summit in Yaounde, Cameroon, and UN Resolution 2039 (2012)on piracy in 
the Gulf of Guinea are perhaps the most significant developments. Maritime security 
thus features rather prominently in this region, but the threats and responses are 
different from those along the east coast. 
Threats and vulnerabilities off West Africa connect with offshore resources, 
and security forces are often at the forefront of counter-measures. Resource 
diplomacy by interested parties shows some military overtures, with the US and 
China being the two lead actors. Several channels exist for funnelling arms and 
military skills into West Africa in an attempt to bolster local military capabilities to 
handle threats better. The US uses foreign military sales, military training and 
education programmes, as well as joint military exercises between West African 
navies and the US. China negotiates oil-for-arms deals with Gulf countries, but also 
with adjacent countries from which the arms flow to littoral countries on the Gulf.78 
One important military actor is the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) with a 





With a year-round naval presence in the Gulf region, the underlying sentiments 
remain that AFRICOM is primarily destined to help ensure US energy security off 
the coast of West Africa.79 
The UN acknowledges the wider threat environment in West Africa and 
maritime insecurity in particular.80 The UN also calls for actions through a shared 
responsibility, but the focus seems to remain primarily within the landward realm. 
The UN noted, however, that an offshore threat to good order at sea exists, but the 
responses are more regional than UN-led. Several cooperative initiatives are visible 
– either suggested or in operation – but not so visibly under the aegis of the UN as 
found off the Horn of Africa. 
The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)  
The GGC came into operation in 2006 (established 2001) to prevent, 
manage and resolve conflict between member states where offshore mineral 
resources become an issue.81 As a West African response, the GGC aims to prevent 
and resolve threats in a maritime region that could well house West Africa’s future 
economic lifeblood. The Commission aims to resolve disputes about unsettled 
maritime boundaries that hold the potential of armed conflict if not resolved 
amicably. Together with the envisaged Gulf of Guinea Guard, the perceived 
outcome is a political as well as operational institution to consult and enforce, if 
necessary, matters pertaining to regional maritime security.82 
Maritime Organisation of West and Central African States (MOWCA)83  
Twenty coastal and five landlocked states form part of MOWCA, and the 
most significant contribution stems from attempts to establish a sub-regional 
coastguard, a regional maritime fund and communications centre. In co-operation 
with the IMO, MOWCA aims to create co-operative networks to enforce standing 
international arrangements better, to counter threats such as piracy, robberies and 
pollution, and to promote safety at sea through existing conventions.84 MOWCA 
represents the largest maritime security grouping in the region and as such acts as an 
umbrella organisation for a range of maritime actors and interested parties.85 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)  
The UN shows a preference for ECOWAS as the lead actor against security 
threats in West Africa, but a credible maritime capability through appropriate naval 
and coastguard assets remains weakly developed within its security architecture.86 
Within the envisaged framework of the UN, co-operative ventures between 
ECOWAS, the AU, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as the UN Office in 





are already set in place to deal with threats and vulnerabilities in the region 
bordering the Gulf of Guinea. The UN, ECOWAS, the AU and AFRICOM (in spite 
of numerous obstacles such as mistrust and insufficient resources) show some 
progress for the imperative of cooperative or collaborative action against maritime 
threats. 
Private security contractors  
Foreign and local private security firms contribute visibly to maritime 
security in the Gulf of Guinea. Particularly relevant are the services offered to port 
and offshore facilities. Indigenous security arrangements provide services on land, 
while international security firms help to protect offshore infrastructure.87 One 
important driver of the growth in private security agencies in the region is an 
apparent lack of well-trained and properly equipped security forces – policing 
agencies in particular.88 The policing void amidst a security landscape calling for 
credible security establishments to offset criminal and other non-state threats is 
increasingly filled by the private security industry.89 In Nigeria, local and national 
private security companies represent a vibrant business sector. The oil sector shows 
the integration of governmental and private security agencies to protect this vital 
asset against attacks by groups harbouring political or criminal agendas.90 Private 
security services assume responsibility for offshore security by patrolling offshore 
and inland waterways together with elements of the Nigerian security forces. These 
security elements co-operate closely with Nigerian forces and expose them to the 
expertise of private contractors, and the latter learn more about the complex politics 
of the Niger delta region.91 From a training perspective, Military Professional 
Resources Incorporated, for example, trains a coastguard for Equatorial Guinea, and 
it appears that private companies are contracted to fill what seems to be a significant 
need for properly trained maritime security agencies, personnel and leaders.92 
Conclusions 
Africa’s vast offshore domain is vitally important for the continent as well as 
the international community and a matter towards which African leaders and 
institutions are turning their attention. Piracy has sensitised both Africa and the 
international community to threats off Africa, but it also skewed the debate towards 
a problem-solving approach in the piracy–anti-piracy mould. Responses to piracy 
mask the general regression of good order at sea as depicted by possible terrorist 
threats, illegal oil bunkering, drug smuggling, illegal or unsafe resource exploitation, 
weak jurisdiction and the dangers of unsettled maritime boundaries. The more 





and accommodates piracy within the wider field of responses informed by maritime 
security and maritime strategy respectively.  
East and West Africa harbour multiple actions to restore good order at sea. 
Off East Africa, the Horn region in particular, extensive land and offshore actions by 
a host of parties integrate international and African initiatives that broadly fall under 
the aegis of the UN, private and African regional bodies. The different initiatives 
reside close to the maritime notion for they combine landward and offshore matters 
to address the interplay of measures at sea and on land for political, economic and 
humanitarian reasons. Off West Africa, and Nigeria in particular, landward politics 
play out explicitly in offshore threats. The responses result more from regional 
arrangements, co-operation and agreements to promote good order in the Gulf of 
Guinea and public–private partnerships. Both regions now begin to portray a 
response repertoire that reaches further than merely fighting piracy and a security 
landscape better understood along the lines of the imperative for good order. The 
latter approach offers scope for decision-makers to harness it as a vehicle to shift 
maritime security off Africa beyond the anti-piracy emphasis. 
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